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Abstract
I describe two ampliﬁcations mechanisms that operate during liquidity crises and discuss the scope for
central bank policies during crises as well as preventive policies in advance of crises. The ﬁrst mechanism
works through asset prices and balance sheets. A negative shock to the balance sheets of asset-holders
causes them to liquidate assets, lowering prices, further deteriorating balance sheets, culminating in a
crisis. The second mechanism involves investors’ Knightian uncertainty. Unusual shocks to untested
ﬁnancial innovations lead agents to become uncertain about their investments causing them to disengage
from markets and increase their demand for liquidity. This behavior leads to a loss of liquidity and a
crisis.
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11 Introduction
The credit crisis that began in the Summer of 2007, and continues unabated as of this writing, is a powerful
reminder of the importance of ﬁnancial market liquidity for macroeconomic stability. Central banks have
actively intervened to stabilize ﬁnancial markets and institutions, aiming to forestall any spillovers into the
real economy. In many ways, both in the behavior of ﬁnancial markets and the response of central banks,
this recent episode is not unique. It recalls past liquidity crises such as the 1998 hedge fund crisis, the 1987
stock market crash, and the 1970 Penn Central default.
There are broadly two ways to think about liquidity crises. Beginning with Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s
model of bank runs, there is a large literature that models crises as random events; the self-conﬁrming bad
equilibrium in a model of multiple equilibria. On the other hand, most crises involve some fundamental shock
– often originating in the asset market – that is ampliﬁed.1 For example, in the 1998 event, the Russian
default triggered a chain of losses that culminated in the bailout of Long Term Capital Management. In the
recent subprime crisis, the direct losses due to household default on subprime mortgages is estimated to be
at most $500 bn, yet the eﬀects of the subprime shock have been far reaching (and would have likely been
larger if not for central bank intervention). Moreover, in both cases, there was contagion, as the shock led
to losses in seemingly unrelated markets: in 1998, the mortgage-backed securities market was aﬀected; while
recently, even the market for government guaranteed student loans has been aﬀected.2
These observations suggest that there are ampliﬁcation mechanisms that are at work during liquidity
crises. In this paper, I review two important ampliﬁcation mechanisms. The ﬁrst is a balance sheet am-
pliﬁcation that works through asset prices and balance sheet constraints. Roughly the model I present will
illustrate the following story: a negative asset price shock causes balance sheet constraints on asset-holders
to tighten, causing assets to be liquidated, lowering asset prices further, and so on. The mechanism here is
familiar and is the subject of a substantial literature which I will (partially) review.
I next review an ampliﬁcation mechanism that works through agents’ uncertainty. Many liquidity crises
surround ﬁnancial innovations that were rapidly adopted by market participants. In the subprime crisis, the
CDOs and associated credit derivatives that are at the center of the crisis, represent ﬁnancial assets that
1Even in the bank run case, Gorton (1988) shows historically that bank runs were associated with negative economic shocks,
casting doubt on the sunspot multiple equilibria model. Papers such as Morris and Shin (1998) and Rochet and Vives (2004)
resolve the issue by constructing an ampliﬁcation mechanism whereby a negative economic shock triggers the bank run.
2For further details on the 1998 crisis, see Scholes (2000). See Brunnermeier (2008) for further details on the subprime crisis.
2have grown from less than $1 tn in 2000 to over $5 tn today. New innovations necessarily mean that market
participants have a short time within which they formulate valuation, risk management, and hedging models.
A liquidity crisis occurs when the new ﬁnancial assets behave in unexpected ways. Lacking a historical record
to refer to, market participants are faced with risks they don’t understand, and treat these risks as Knightian
(Knight, 1925). Investors’ response in this case is to disengage from risks and seek liquid investments, which
can lead to a liquidity crisis dynamic.
Thus, one objective of this paper is to clarify these two ampliﬁcation mechanisms and discuss their
relevance during past crises. The second objective of the paper is to clarify the role for policy during a
liquidity crisis. In both models, there is a scope for ex-post policies, such as liquidity provision through a
lender of last resort. The same forces that underly the negative-shock ampliﬁcation mechanism also lead
to a beneﬁcial ampliﬁcation of central bank liquidity provision. There is also scope for ex-ante policies,
particularly in the balance sheet ampliﬁcation mechanism. The private sector generally will not internalize
the full costs of a crisis. This opens the door to investigating preventive policies in the form of liquidity
requirements and capital requirements on the ﬁnancial sector. I discuss the scope for these policies in both
ampliﬁcation mechanisms.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss liquidity crises in general terms, address-
ing the following basic questions: What is liquidity? What happens to liquidity in a crisis? Who are the
main actors aﬀected by a lack of liquidity? I then hone in on the two ampliﬁcation mechanisms mentioned
above, describing each in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Liquidity in a Crisis
2.1 Liquidity and Intermediation
Market participants, academics, and policymakers refer to the “lack of liquidity” in a crisis. What do they
mean by this? The word liquidity is used to refer to a number of distinct ﬁnancial phenomena that are each
pertinent in a crisis. Here are four ways in which the lack of liquidity becomes most apparent.
• Market liquidity falls: An asset is said to have low market liquidity if it is diﬃcult to convert this asset
into a liquid medium such as cash or bank reserves. In a crisis, market participants ﬁnd that their
assets lose market liquidity. Potential trading partners are hard to ﬁnd (Duﬃe, Garleanu, and Pedersen,
32005). Market-makers are reluctant to accumulate inventories and provide immediacy to investors. It is
common in the market micro-structure literature in ﬁnance to measure market liquidityin terms of bid-
ask spreads or price impact measures (Kyle, 1985, O’Hara, 1995, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2000) or trading volume and volatility measures (Amihud, 2002, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). A
number of papers measure the resiliency of an asset – how quickly the asset price recovers following a
large trade – by measuring the negative serial correlation in asset returns (Campbell, Grossman and
Wang, 1993, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).3
• Funding liquidity falls: During crises, borrowers face higher costs in the loan market. A hedge fund
that wants to borrow using ﬁnancial securities as collateral (a “repo agreement”), faces higher collateral
requirements (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). Adrian and Shin (2008a)document that repo market
volumes fall during crises. Unsecured lending, backed broadly by the balance sheet of an institution,
also becomes more costly to obtain. Volume of issuance in the commercial paper market falls and the
spreads of commercial paper yields over Treasury bill yields rise (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). Firms ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to rollover or renew lines of funding from banks. Banks also face higher costs of funding. The
interbank market for liquidity does not function smoothly. Many regulators during the recent subprime
crisis expressed concern that there was “gridlock” in the interbank market: banks were unwilling to
lend to each other and instead hoarded their reserves (McAndrews and Potter, 2002).
• Balance sheet liquidity falls: An institution is liquid – or not liquidity constrained – if its balance sheet
contains predominantly cash-like or other easily saleable assets, and its liabilities are tilted away from
a hard-claim like short-term debt, for which default may lead to bankruptcy, and towards “soft-claims”
like equity. In this instance, balance sheet liquidity is high: if needed, the institution can repay all of
its short-term debt and forestall bankruptcy. Empirical work in corporate ﬁnance often uses cash or
leverage to measure balance sheet liquidity (see Kashyap and Stein, 1995, Gatev and Strahan, 2006,
Adrian and Shin, 2008ab). A common theme in many accounts of crises is that institutions own long
term assets, funded by short term debt, which results in a balance sheet with low liquidity (Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983).
• Flight to liquidity: Investors scramble for liquidity, exiting illiquid investments and seeking liquid
3Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) further distinguish between market liquidity and market liquidity risk – with the latter
carrying a risk premium on innovations to market liquidity.
4investments. They buy secondary market assets that have high market liquidity, and prefer to hold
portfolios in short-term safe claims such as bank deposits that are de-facto liquid. Empirical work ﬁnds
that the price diﬀerences between less and more liquidTreasury bonds, which are otherwise similar, rises
during crises (Krishnamurthy, 2001). Price diﬀerences between less liquid corporate bonds, mortgage-
backed securities, or Agency bonds and more liquid Treasury bonds also rise (Longstaﬀ, 2004, Gabaix,
Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2007, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2008).
To organize these diﬀerent aspects of liquidity shortgage, and provide guidance on which may be more or
less relevant in the big picture, it is helpful to center attention on the ﬁnancial intermediary sector. Beginning
with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is a long tradition of viewing ﬁnancial intermediaries as the nexus
between the real economy’s illiquid assets and households’/investors’ need to hold liquid portfolios.
On the asset side, the intermediary sector is a net holder of complex/specialized assets in which households
lack knowledge to participate in directly. Investment banks and hedge funds intermediate investment in assets
ranging from emerging markets’ debt to mortgage-backed securities. Commercial banks own loans to small
and medium sized businesses, and oﬀer credit lines to larger businesses.
The intermediary sector also provides immediacy to households, enabling them to own claims that they
can easily retrade. Trading desks of investment banks, market makers on stock exchanges, as well as hedge
funds all make markets and support the trading of a multitude of assets.
In addition to owning claims that can be traded, households’ desire for liquid portfolios is satisﬁed by
their owning de-facto liquid claims in the form of short-term low-risk debt. Commercial banks, investment
banks, and hedge funds create short-term debt liquidity through a variety of money-market instruments
including bank deposits, repurchase agreements, and commercial paper.
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the functional role of the intermediary sector. For representative refer-
ences on each of the points raised in the preceding paragraphs, see Grossman and Miller (1988), Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990), and He and Krishnamurthy (2008b).
Financial intermediaries play a key role in most liquidity crises. The recent subprime crisis centers on
commercial banks and investment banks; the 1998 crisis centered on hedge funds; the 1987 crisis on the
market-makers in the stock market; the 1970 Penn Central default on money market mutual funds; and, the
Great Depression on commercial banks.
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Figure 1: Intermediary Functions
Intermediaries provide liquidity to households (arrow to left) and use funds to purchase both
secondarymarket specialized assets (arrow to top right) and make business loans (arrow to bottom
right).
Consider next how a breakdown in ﬁnancial intermediation – fall in liquidity provision to households and
reduced capacity to hold the economy’s illiquid assets – can lead to a lack of liquidity in the dimensions I
have outlined.
Market liquidity falls because the entities that provide market making and immediacy cut back on these
services (Weill, 2007). As hedge funds run into trouble, the markets for the specialized assets they hold
shrinks, and these asset markets also lose market liquidity (He and Krishnamurthy, 2008a).
Funding liquidity falls because credit extension, being a core activity of the intermediary sector, is cut
back (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Commercial bank lending to ﬁrms is curtailed. This is an important
channel for central banks because it indicates a manner in which a liquidity crisis spills over to the real
sector. Additionally, ﬁnancing arrangements within the intermediary sector also tighten; e.g., a commercial
6bank lending to a hedge fund to ﬁnance a position on margin raises the margin requirement.
The latter two liquidities are therefore the result of trouble within the intermediary sector. A more direct
measure of the state of the intermediary sector is its balance sheet liquidity. If intermediaries have less cash,
or lose capital, their balance sheet liquidity suﬀers. This, in turn, leads them to cut back on their various
liquidity provision services. These observations suggest ranking balance sheet liquidity a step above the
other liquidities in analyzing crises. A reduction in the balance sheet liquidity of intermediaries leads to a
contraction in the supply of liquidity provision services by the intermediaries.
Consider next a rise in liquidity demand/ﬂight to liquidity.4 During a crisis, households grow uncertain
about intermediaries and their investments. Their natural response is to disengage and demand liquid and
riskless claims which are less sensitive to their uncertainty. Thus, investors adjust their own investments in
the intermediary sector, recontracting the intermediaries’ liabilities so that they shift towards the short-term
and away from softer claims like long-term debt. These actions in turn reduce the balance sheet liquidity of
the intermediary sector, with knock-on eﬀects on other liquidities.
4This discussion follows from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) who show how given some exogenous liquidity needs for
agents, a rise in Knightian uncertainty increases their liquidity demand. While it is standard in the literature to assume that
households have liquidity needs, there is a deeper question of where these liquidity needs come from. Eisfeldt (2007) writes a
model of a household whose income process may be diﬀerent than its desired consumption process. The discrepancy gives rise
to a demand for liquid assets. However, Eisfeldt shows that a realistic calibration of the model does very poorly in generating
the magnitude of liquidity premia are observed in practice. Faced with a liquid, low return asset, and an illiquid, high return
asset, households time their purchases of illiquid assets to take full advantage of the high return asset without incurring any
of its illiquidity costs. In short, there is no demand for the low-return liquid asset. The result is echoed in other papers in
the literature (e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 1996) and suggests that we need a theory of liquidity demand that does not center on
households’ consumption needs. Here are some approaches that seem promising. Vayanos (2004) presents a model of delegated
fund management in which households withdraw funds from a mutual fund following poor performance. As a result, the mutual
fund manager alters his portfolio to favor liquid over illiquid assets, as household withdrawal states appear more likely. In this
approach, there are no “true” liquidity needs in the economy. However, the inﬂexibilities that arise in contractual relationships
between households and intermediaries create an endogenous source of liquidity demand. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) study corporate liquidity demand. In their models, ﬁrms face external ﬁnancing constraints that
prevent them from undertaking all good investment opportunities. This possibility leads them to insure, ex-ante, against those
states in which the constraints are most tightly binding. The insurance can be represented as a demand for liquid assets, which
the ﬁrm can then use in the needed state.
72.2 Interactions
The lack of liquidity in diﬀerent dimensions can interact. Such interactions are important because they
underly ampliﬁcation mechanisms. The formal analysis of the following sections explores two ampliﬁcation
mechanisms.
As noted in the introduction, the ﬁrst interaction I study is between balance sheet liquidity and asset
market liquidity. In equilibrium, if the liquidity of assets depends on the condition of the asset holders’ bal-
ance sheet, then a systematic deterioration in balance sheets can reduce asset liquidity, further deteriorating
balance sheets, and so on.
The second interaction I study is between investors’ liquidity needs and intermediaries’ balance sheet
liquidity. I study a model in which a rise in uncertainty causes investors’ liquidity demand to rise. Suppose
again that the liquidity of an asset depends on the balance sheet liquidity of a ﬁnancial institution that acts
as the market-maker in that asset. A rise in uncertainty makes an investor concerned that the liquidity needs
of other investors will rise and in satisfying this liquidity need, the balance sheet liquidity of the market-
maker will fall. Suppose that every investor is symmetrically in this position. Then, the rise in liquidity
needs deteriorates balance sheet liquidity of the market maker, causing a loss of market liquidity in the asset.
In addition to describing these ampliﬁcation mechanisms, I discuss how central bank policy can alleviate
a liquidity crisis. This brings me to another aspect of liquidity that deserves mention.
Macroeconomic or monetary liquidity: The central bank has control over the supply of government-
backed liquid assets and increases this supply during crises. Typically, the central bank injects liquidity
by expanding the supply of bank reserves, and in the recent subprime crisis the Fed conducted swaps of
(less liquid) mortgage-backed securities for (more liquid) Treasury securities. The central bank also directly
lends reserves through the discount window in a targeted fashion to commercial, and recently, investment
banks. Discount window policy also has an important commitment dimension. The Fed typically commits to
making reserves freely available to banks at some predetermined rate. This commitment may be important
in cases where banks are unsure whether they will be able to access liquidity from private sources in every
contingency.5
5There is a related notion of government supplied liquidity that appears in the literature, labeled aggregate liquidity by
Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). When the central bank acts as a lender of last resort during a crisis, it
is ultimately redistributing real resources across private parties. The lender of last resort is valuable because resources, from
8In the models I study, the important dimension of monetary policy is in enhancing the ﬁnancial sector’s
balance sheet liquidity. The central bank’s willingness to absorb less liquid assets on to its balance sheet,
providing more liquid assets to the private sector in return, enhances balance sheet liquidity and drives the
beneﬁt to policy.
3 Benchmark Model of Liquidity Provision
I begin by introducing a benchmark model that I use to discuss the two ampliﬁcation mechanisms operating
during liquidity crises.
The model has a ﬁnancial intermediary – commercial bank, market-maker, trading desk, etc. – that
sells an asset at date 0 to a class of atomistic investors. While the asset matures at date 2, the investors
purchase the asset at date 0 in part because the intermediary stands ready to buy back the asset at date
1 if an investor wishes to liquidate. That is, the intermediary commits to be a liquidity provider for the
asset. The intermediary has resources of L — cash, or some other liquid medium — to back up the liquidity
commitment. L may be thought of as the balance sheet liquidity of the intermediary.
An investor may receive a shock at date 1 whereby he needs to liquidate the asset. Investors come in
two classes, A and B. The shock is independent across the classes, but perfectly correlated within a class.
The probability that a shock aﬀects any one agent is φ. Thus, there are four liquidity shock possibilities at
date 1: ω ∈ Ω ≡ {no,A,B,AB}. ω = no is the no shock case and occurs with probability (1 − φ)2; ω = A
is shock to class A, with probability (1−φ)φ; ω = B is shock to class B, with probability (1−φ)φ; ω = AB
is shocks to both classes, with probability φ2.
either the private sector or the central bank, that are injected into the aﬀected parties has a large multiplier. The government
is special in executing the transfer only because of credibility: the government can credibly commit to transfer a much larger
amount of resources than a private party such as an insurance company. Holmstrom and Tirole consider a model in which the
government securitizes this commitment by issuing government bonds that it sells ex-ante to the private sector. The private
sector then trades these bonds, along with private securities, to arrange for an optimal state-contingent transfer of resources,
in the event of a liquidity crisis. Aggregate liquidity is a measure of how much of these transfers can be arranged. Gorton and
Huang (2004) study a related model where both the private and the public sector supplies liquidity against crises. Their analysis
sheds light on the moral hazard consequences of supplying public liquidity, and thereby articulates the costs and beneﬁts of
public liquidity provision. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) also study a model where both private and public sector supply
liquidity. Their analysis demonstrates conditions under which public supply is a complement to private supply of liquidity,
hence alleviating the moral hazard concern.
9I normalize things as follows. There is a unit measure of each class of agents. Each owns one unit of the
asset at date 0, so that there are two shares of the asset outstanding. The asset pays one at date 2.
The intermediary promises to buy back the asset at the price of one, unless it exhausts L, in which case
it allocates L equally to all liquidating investors. If l1 is the measure of investors liquidating, the date 1
asset price is:
P ω
1 (L) = min
￿
1,
L
l1
￿
. (1)
I assume that the liquidity of the ﬁnancial intermediary satisﬁes:
1 < L < 2.
Thus, in the cases of no or one shock, the intermediary has suﬃcient L to redeem shares at a price of one,
while in the case of both shocks, the intermediary redeems shares at the price,
P AB
1 (L) =
L
2
Assuming investors are risk neutral, the price of the asset at date 0 is,
P0 = 1 − (1 − L/2)φ
2. (2)
We can think of (1−L/2)φ2 as the liquidity discount on the asset, which is therefore a measure of the asset’s
market liquidity. Clearly this discount is decreasing in L.
4 Ampliﬁcation through Balance Sheets and Asset Prices
Most investors in the sophisticated ﬁnancial markets aﬀected by liquidity crises – i.e. the mortgage and
credit markets in the current subprime crisis, or the sovereign debt and derivative markets of the 1998 crisis
– are themselves ﬁnancial intermediaries who are managing the funds of an ultimate household. Examples of
these investors are hedge funds or banks, as well as pension funds and mutual funds. Theory then suggests
that there may be agency conﬂicts between the household-investor and the intermediary that can aﬀect the
intermediary’s investment decisions. As in corporate ﬁnance, where a similar manager-shareholder conﬂict
arises, the intermediary’s investment will depend on external ﬁnancing conditions and the condition of its
balance sheet.
Hedge funds raise equity from a clientele that is a combination of the managers of the hedge fund and
wealthy households/institutional investors. They raise debt, mostly in the form of repo ﬁnancing, from other
10investors. Thus a hedge fund manages the funds contributed via both debt and equity contracts of some
ultimate household. If hedge funds have lost money, or if they are holding particularly illiquid assets during
a period of market illiquidity, investors may be unwilling to invest in either the equity or debt of the hedge
fund. In this case, the hedge may have to reoptimize its portfolio, selling some assets and holding more
liquid assets.
Mutual funds raise moneys predominantlythrough equity contributions of households. A well documented
regularity is that the investors in mutual funds withdraw their funds following poor performance. Again,
there is a relationship between the investment decisions of the mutual fund and its balance sheet (or change
thereof).
If the liquidity of the ﬁnancial market depends on the health of participants’ balance sheets, then a
feedback mechanism emerges whereby a negative shock in the ﬁnancial market worsens balance sheets,
reducing ﬁnancial market liquidity, feeding back into balance sheets, and so on.
4.1 Balance Sheet Constraint
I alter the baseline liquidation model to introduce balance sheet concerns. I assume that the investors in
the model are themselves intermediaries who are investing the money of some ultimate household. To be
concrete, I will label these investment-intermediaries as hedge funds. But as noted above, one can equally
think of them as commercial banks or institutional investors. I study a model in which the investment
decisions of these hedge funds are a function of the health of their balance sheets.
The hedge funds purchase the asset at date 0. If they need some liquidity at date 1, the liquidity provider
with L units of resources commits to buy back the assets. In the subprime case, we can think of the hedge
fund as a buyer of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the liquidityprovider as a commercial or investment
bank that makes markets in the MBS. Another labeling that ﬁts the recent crisis is to think of the investor
as a small commercial bank or institutional investor that had invested in a structured investment vehicle and
the liquidity provider as a large commercial bank that had provided the liquidity backstop for the vehicle.
Note that one can also introduce balance sheet concerns into the liquidity provider of the model — this
is another logical path to take — but it turns out to be easier to exposit the ampliﬁcation mechanism by
modifying the investor side.
Figure 2 illustrates the players in the model. At date 0, the hedge fund raises debt from households of
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Figure 2: Balance Sheet Model
Households provide funds to hedge funds, who invest the funds in secondary market assets, ex-
pecting there to be a liquidity provider that stands ready to buy back the asset if the hedge funds
needs to liquidate.
d0 and equity of P0 −d0, so that the total funds raised are exactly enough to buy one unit of the asset. The
hedge fund is also subject to the exogenous liquidation shocks introduced earlier.
Deﬁne the equity capital of the hedge fund at date 1 as,
w1 = P1 − d0.
This equity capital is a measure of the balance sheet liquidity of the hedge fund. That is, since the hedge
fund could sell the asset at date 1 at price P1 and repay d0 of debt, the diﬀerence P1 − d0 reﬂects the liquid
resources available to the fund. For now, I ﬁx the debt level exogenously at d0 < L
2, and moreover assume
for simplicity that the debt carries no interest. Since the lowest date 1 price is L
2 the debt can always be
fully repaid.
Suppose that the date 1 holdings of the fund are subject to a margin constraint. In particular, deﬁne θ1
12as holdings of the fund at date 1 (after any liquidations). The constraint is that,
mθ1 ≤ w1. (3)
The fund must have equity capital commensurate to the size of its asset market position. We may think of
m as a margin requirement per unit of asset holding, so that to hold θ1 units of the asset, the fund must put
up total margin of mθ1.
Note that since w1 is decreasing in P1, the balance sheet constraint tightens as market prices falls. In
this sense, the constraint captures an important feature of crises: market conditions and ﬁnancing conditions
worsen at the same time.
The interpretation of m as a margin is close to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) who develop the
margin interpretation of this constraint in depth, discussing the rationales in the institutional context of
margin setting. An important observation they make is that margins are typically set based on asset price
volatility. But, in an equilibrium setting, asset price volatility may be increasing in the tightness of the
margin constraint. This describes a feedback loop between volatility and margin constraints.
If we step back from the margins interpretation of constraint (3), it is worth noting that there are other
balance sheet constraints that appear in the literature which are close to (3) and importantly preserve the
relation between the constraint and market prices.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a model in which lenders limit the debtor’s investments based on
pledged collateral. Suppose that the assets of θ1 can be pledged as collateral to a lender who forwards up to
γθ1P1 against these assets (where γ < 1). Then, to purchase θ1 units of asset, the budget constraint for the
hedge fund is,
θ1P1 ≤ γθ1P1 + w1
or, rewriting,
(1 − γ)P1θ1 ≤ w1. (4)
This constraint, if we deﬁne m = (1 − γ)P1, is identical to the constraint (3). There is a price dependence
on m which makes it diﬀerent. However, in spirit, this constraint also preserves the eﬀect that a reduction
in w1 causes θ1 to fall.6
6To see this, substitute w1 = P1 − d0 into equation (4), to ﬁnd that,
(1 − γ)θ1 ≤ 1 −
d0
P1
.
13He and Krishnamurthy (2008a) develop a model in which an incentive conﬂict aﬀects the participation
of outside investors in a fund. In their model, a hedge fund manager as part of an optimal contract is
required to put up some of his own wealth into the fund. Denote the manager’s wealth as w1. He and
Krishnamurthy derive a contract whereby outside investors are willing to coinvest in the fund, at most, a
multiple M times the manager’s investment in the fund. The coinvestment constraint implies that the total
funds that are under management by the hedge fund must be less than w1 + Mw1. With these funds, the
manager purchases θ1 units of assets. Then the fund’s budget constraint is,
P1θ1 ≤ w1(1 + M)
or,
1
1 + M
P1θ1 ≤ w1 (5)
This constraint is identical to (4), and again preserves the key interaction between w1 and the asset position
θ1. The fact that there are many contexts in which a constraint similar to (3) arises indicates that the
balance sheet mechanism may be pervasive.
Let us analyze the margin constraint in (3) further. Deﬁne,
l1 = 1 − θ1 (6)
as the amount of asset liquidated by the hedge fund at date 1. If a fund receives a liquidity shock then
l1 = 1 by deﬁnition. The interesting case to study is endogenous liquidation. Thus, let us focus on a fund
that does not receive a liquidity shock. For this fund, l1 = 0 if the constraint does not bind, while if the
constraint binds, substitute to ﬁnd:
l1 = 1 +
1
m
(d0 − P ω
1 ). (7)
Liquidationsincrease as the price falls and leverage (d0) rises, capturing the balance sheet eﬀect I have alluded
to. The required margin m has two eﬀects on liquidation. First, since d0 is always less than P ω
1 , increasing
m increases liquidations. This is also apparent by inspecting the capital constraint (3) where raising m
tightens the constraint. Second, from (7) we see that raising m decreases the sensitivity of liquidations to
price conditional on the constraint binding. This is also intuitive from (3): if the constraint is binding, a fall
in w1 tightens the constraint less when m is large.
As P1 falls, the right hand side of this equation falls, tightening the constraint and thereby reducing θ1.
14In state ω = no, total liquidations across both hedge funds are 2l1 (which may be zero if l1 = 0). In
state ω = A or ω = B, total liquidations are l1 +1. State ω = AB has only the exogenous liquidation of two
shares.
The price is set by the liquidity provider as before:
P no
1 = min
￿
1,
L
2l1
￿
, P A
1 = P B
1 = min
￿
1,
L
l1 + 1
￿
, P AB
1 =
L
2
l1
P1
l1 = 1 – (P1 - d0)/m
P1 = L / 2 l1 or l1 = L/2P1
P1=1
E3
E2
E1
Figure 3: Liquidation Equilibria
Price is on the X-axis and quantity liquidated on the Y -axis. The curved-then-straight line is the
liquidity provider’s price-setting function. The negatively sloped line is the hedge fund liquidation
function, pictured for a low value of d0 and a high value of d0.
Figure 3 presents the equilibrium price determination graphically. The price is on the X-axis, while
the quantity liquidated is on the Y -axis. If liquidations are low, the liquidity provider has suﬃcient L to
redeem all shares at P1 = 1. This is the vertical segment corresponding to the intermediary’s price-setting
function. When liquidations exceeds L/2 shares, the price falls with liquidations. This is the curved part of
15the price-setting function.
The hedge fund’s liquidation function of (7) is also pictured. This function is linearly decreasing in price,
describing the heart of the balance sheet feedback: low prices induce liquidation.7 Let us take the case of
state ω = no. If d0 is low, we have the no-liquidation equilibrium at P1 = 1. As d0 rises, the liquidation
function shifts to the right. If d0 rises suﬃciently the liquidation function intersects thrice with the price-
setting curve. The multiple crossing can also occur in states ω = A,B, where for a given d0, the exogenous
liquidity shock shifts the function up.
The multiple crossing case is one of multiple equilibria and illustrates the balance-sheet feedback loop.8
Equilibrium E1 is a no-liquidation equilibrium in which P = 1. Equilibrium E2 is a moderate liquidation
equilibrium where the price falls below one, and the hedge funds liquidate some of their holdings. Equilibrium
E3 is the severe liquidation equilibrium: low prices and large liquidations. In both E2 and E3 if agents
expect prices to be low, they liquidate positions and push prices down. Note that of the two liquidation
equilibria, E2 is an unstable equilibrium (i.e. any perturbation of prices or quantities moves the equilibrium
to either E1 or E3), while E3 is the stable liquidation equilibrium. I will focus on equilibria E1 and E3 in
the analysis that follows.
The feedback loop illustrated by the model has been explored in diﬀerent contexts within the literature.
Allen and Gale (2005) present a model in which a bank is funded by demandable deposits and holds assets
whose price is determined in a market equilibrium. There is a feedback loop between bank runs, asset
liquidation, and lower asset prices and value of bank equity. Diamond and Rajan (2005) present a related
analysis in which the contracts underlying relationships are derived from optimal contracting considerations
but the liquidation price of the asset is ﬁxed exogenously. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe a feedback
loop because investors withdraw moneys from an arbitrageur if the arbitrageur loses money. Morris and
7Introducing balance sheet concerns into the liquidity provider would tilt the liquidity provider’s price-setting function
further to the left, ﬂattening the curve. This will create another source of ampliﬁcation.
8If the balance sheet constraint binds, the equilibrium values of l1 in equilibria E2 and E3 are the roots of the quadratic
equation:
l2
1 − (1 + d0/m)l1 +
1
2m
L = 0
The parameters required to arrive at the three-crossing solution depicted in the ﬁgure are: L < 1, d0 < L/2, and a suitably
chosen value of m (slightly lower than 1−d0) so that the solutions to the quadratic equation are not complex and in the solution
l1 < 1. Note that if m < 1 − d0 the balance sheet constraint does not bind at a value of P1 = 1. This deﬁnes the equilibrium
E1.
16Shin (2004) describe a feedback loop in a model where traders have short horizons and trading limits. As
mentioned earlier, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) present a model in which the borrowing constraint is a
function of market price volatility, which is itself a function of the actions of the constrained agents. Vayanos
(2004) presents a related analysis where the investors in a hedge fund withdraw money if volatility rises.
Vayanos’ model is fully dynamic which helps to understand the behavior of a risk premium on volatility
innovations.9 There is also work in a multiple asset setting in which the feedback loop can be used to
explain contagion eﬀects. Kyle and Xiong (2001) is representative of this work. The models in this branch
of the literature present the result that a shock in one market tightens balance sheet constraints and causes
liquidations and falling asset prices in another market.
The common point in all of this work is that the balance sheet mechanism can help explain how liquidity
can deteriorate. Equally, this work demonstrates an ampliﬁcation mechanism for shocks. If we focus on the
liquidation equilibrium E3, any shock that perturbs either curve has large eﬀects on the equilibrium price
and quantity since both curves are negatively sloped.
4.2 Crisis Policy
The multiple liquidation equilibria is a coordination failure and can motivate central bank intervention.
As in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) bank-run model, central bank policy via a lender of last resort can
eliminate the coordination failure. Suppose that the central bank commits to inject 2 − L of cash into the
liquidity provider if either d0 is large enough, or there are the exogenous liquidation shocks ω = A,B.10 This
commitment makes the price-setting curve fully vertical at price P = 1 and rules out the bad equilibrium.
The policy can be implemented through the discount window with the central bank agreeing to lend
funds to the liquidity provider against the collateral of the asset. Another way to implement this policy is
for the central bank to act as a “market-maker of last resort” (Buiter and Sibert, 2007). Again if either d0
is large enough, or if ω = A,B, the central bank commits to purchase the asset directly if P < 1. The policy
rules out the bad equilibrium. In both cases, the important dimension of the policy is that the central bank
commits to absorb the illiquid asset onto its balance sheet, providing a liquid asset such as cash in return.
9In these papers, it is because assets are “marked to market” that there is a feedback loop. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008)
build on this observation in analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of “mark to market” accounting rules.
10Since in state AB there is no coordination failure there is also no special gain to committing to purchase the asset in that
state.
17The commitment to enhance the balance sheet liquidity of the liquidity provider severs the feedback loop.11
4.3 Ex-ante Policy
The balance-sheet model opens the door to studying ex-ante policy. That is, the date 1 multiple equilibria
are due to an externality among agents. If we focus on date 0, then the ex-ante debt choice aﬀects the
strength of the date 1 externality. As I will show, this logic implies that generally the date 0 debt choice
of the hedge fund is ineﬃcient. The result is one of the intellectual underpinnings of prudential capital or
liquidity requirements, or more generally, regulation of the balance sheet liquidity of the ﬁnancial sector.
Since the externality is present with or without the exogenous liquidity shocks, I simplify the presentation
by removing these shocks and set φ = 0. I will focus on the case presented in Figure 3, where d0 is large
enough so that equilibrium is either E1 or E3 (as noted above, I discard E2). The selection between these
equilibria is determined by the realization of a sunspot. With probability Φ the sunspot realization chooses
the E3 equilibrium, while with probability 1 − Φ the E1 equilibrium is chosen.
I carry out the following experiment. Suppose that a hedge fund increases the date 0 debt ﬁnancing of d0
by a small amount and reduces the equity contribution by the same small amount so that the date 0 asset
position is unchanged. I compute the ex-ante valuation of this change for a single fund and contrast this
number with the same computation when the entire hedge fund class increases d0. As one would conjecture,
both of these valuations are negative since increasing d0 increases date 1 liquidations. The interesting result
is that generally the private cost of debt is smaller than the social cost, suggesting that agents may over-
leverage in equilibrium. Note that my experiment is silent on the beneﬁt of debt over equity ﬁnancing.
Rather than getting into a model of corporate ﬁnancing to derive this advantage, I will imagine ﬁxing this
beneﬁt and holding it constant across the two computations.
Consider ﬁrst the single agent computation. A hedge fund’s expected value from asset holding, given d0
and P ω
1 , is:
V
P = (1 − Φ) + Φ
￿
(1 − l
E3
1 ) + l
E3
1 P
E3
1
￿
The ﬁrst term in this expression reﬂects the expected payoﬀ from not having to liquidate the asset in the E1
equilibrium, while the second term is the expected payoﬀ when there is lE3
1 liquidation in the E3 equilibrium.
11Implicitly this policy also requires that the central bank is as knowledgeable as the liquidity provider or hedge fund about
how to value the asset.
18Diﬀerentiating this expression, I ﬁnd:
∂V P
∂d0
= −Φ(1 − P E3
1 )
∂lE3
1
∂d0
= −Φ(1 − P E3
1 )
1
m
, (8)
where the second line follows from expression (7). The cost of higher leverage is that the asset may be
liquidated early at price P E3
1 rather than held to maturity to yield a payoﬀ of one.
For the entire hedge fund class, the expected value is,
V S = (1 − Φ) + Φ
￿
(1 − lE3
1 ) +
L
2
￿
where I have rewritten V P substituting in from the equilibrium condition that P E3
1 = L
2lE3
1
. Diﬀerentiating
again,
∂V S
∂d0
= −Φ
∂lE3
1
∂d0
= −Φ
￿
1
m
−
∂P E3
1
∂d0
￿
(9)
Relative to the single agent case, the computation must account for the general equilibrium eﬀect of d0 on
P E3
1 . From Figure 3, we see that increasing d0 shifts the liquidation function to the right and lowers P E3
1
(i.e. increases liquidations). Hence,
￿
￿
￿
￿
∂V S
∂d0
￿
￿
￿
￿ > Φ/m > Φ(1 − P E3
1 )/m =
￿
￿
￿
￿
∂V P
∂d0
￿
￿
￿
￿,
where these derivatives are negative.
Intuitively, the social cost of debt is higher than the private cost of debt because a single hedge fund does
not take into account that its increasing d0 at date 0 makes the fund have to liquidate more asset at date 1,
pushing prices lower at date 1, which in turn results in greater liquidations by other hedge funds. Since the
market price is endogenous at date 1 to the trades of the hedge funds, the trading externality that is present
at date 1 translates into a ﬁnancing externality at date 0.
Thus a central bank policy that restricts date 0 leverage, or imposes a minimum equity capital require-
ment, can improve welfare. These are common regulations for commercial banks, and some of the recent
policy discussion regards extending these regulations to other parts of the ﬁnancial sector including hedge
funds and investment banks.
19In more general settings, the externality leads to “underinsurance” against the crisis equilibrium – the
leverage externality of the current model is just one instance of underinsurance. Consider for instance a
model in which there are many states at date 1 with diﬀering amount of L, and L < 2 in only a few of
these states. In such a model, the optimal policy will call for agents to have more liquid balance sheets
(i.e more w, less d) in only the crisis states. Thus more generally the policy I have outlined concerns the
risk management of balance sheet liquidity. The externality leads agents to make ex-ante asset and liability
choices that leaves them with a less liquid balance sheet in crisis states.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) study the underinsurance externality in the context of emerging
market’s crises and discuss ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices over domestic and foreign currency debt arguing that
ﬁrms will undervalue the insurance beneﬁt of denominating debt in domestic currency. Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) study a similar externality in a dynamic model of collateral constrained arbitrage and show that the
arbitrageurs trade too early in trying to proﬁt from the arbitrage opportunity.12
Finally, strictly speaking if I deﬁne welfare in the current model as the sum of hedge fund/household and
liquidity-provider utility, then since liquidations just leads to transfers, the date 0 debt choice does not aﬀect
welfare. It is straightforward to consider setting where quantities (i.e. real investment) adjusts and describe
ex-ante policies that are Pareto improving. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) for a full treatment of
ex-ante policies.
4.4 Dynamic Model
It is possible to embed the balance sheet mechanism I have described within a full-ﬂedged dynamic equi-
librium model. This is done in papers such as Xiong (2001), Vayanos (2004), and He and Krishnamurthy
(2008b). I will brieﬂy sketch the model of He and Krishnamurthy, and present some illustrative results from
the calibrated model of that paper.
The economy is set in continuous time. There is a risky asset which pays a ﬂow of dividends Dt, where,
dDt
Dt
= gdt + σdZt
Zt is a Brownian motion process and represents the risk in the economy.
12For related treatments, see Diamond and Rajan (2005) in a banking context, and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in a model
of government liquidity policy.
20The risky asset is held through intermediaries that are each subject to a balance sheet constraint. In
particular, the intermediaries are run by owner-managers who own wt of the equity in the fund. The owner-
manager makes decisions on how much money to raise from outside investors, and over the portfolio (risky
and riskless asset shares) held by the intermediary. Given wt, the model imposes a constraint that an
intermediary (or the owner-manager of the intermediary) can raise outside funds of at most Mwt, where M
is a constant. Here, wt may be thought of as the capital of an intermediary and determines the ﬁnancing
conditions for an intermediary.
The lenders/outside-investors in the economy are modeled as households who can directly invest in the
riskless bond, but can only gain exposure to the risky asset allocating their wealth to an intermediary. The
investment in the intermediary is subject to the capital constraint described above. The portfolio decision
within the intermediary is made by the owner-manager rather than the household-investor. Households also
receive labor income, calibrated to reﬂect the typical proﬁle for a U.S. household.
The mechanics of this model are similar to the static model described in the previous section. Past
investment decisions of the agents in the economy along with the realizations of dividend shocks determine
the wt of a representative intermediary. At date t, wt determines the strength of the balance sheet mechanism.
The central feature of the model is that there is a cutoﬀ level for wt so that that the balance sheet mechanism
is only operational for values of wt below this cutoﬀ. Figure 4 graphs the instantaneous risk premium on
the risky asset as a function of wt, illustrating the balance sheet mechanism.
When wt is lower, the balance sheet constraint is tighter and the risk premium is higher. Intuitively, the
model works as follows. As the risky asset is only held through the intermediaries, the amount of economy-
wide capital that is devoted to bearing the risk in this asset is the sum of wt plus the funds that households
contribute to the intermediary sector. When wt is low, households’ are willing to contribute at most Mwt.
In particular, in the states where wt is low, the constraint causes households’ risk-bearing capital to be
sidelined. The total risk-bearing capital is limited to wt(1 + M). In equilibrium, since this limited capital
bears all of the dividend and price risk of the risky asset, the risk premium has to rise to clear the market.
The eﬀect is monotonic in wt.
Because the model is multi-period, it embeds dynamic linkages that are absent in the static model
described earlier. In particular, a tighter constraint in the future aﬀects the asset price in the future. But
since today’s asset price depends in part on the future asset price, today’s price is a function of the future
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Figure 4: Risk Premium and Steady State Distribution
The dashed line graphs the risk premium (y-axis) as a function of wt scaled by the dividend, Dt. The red vertical
line indicates the region in the state space, to the left of which the constraint binds. Also pictured is the steady state
distribution of the state variable in order to indicate the relevant range of variation of the risk premium.
balance sheet constraint. Of course the balance sheet constraint today and in the future are themselves
dependent on asset prices, so that the feedback mechanism occurs simultaneously at multiple dates.
This type of dynamic can shed light on how an economy recovers from a crisis. Table 1 presents results
from simulating the model begining with an initial “crisis” condition. The initial condition is the state with
risk premium of 20% (“Transit from”). Simulating the model from that initial condition, the table reports
the ﬁrst passage time that the state hits the risk premium corresponding to that in the “Transit to” column.
The times in the table are reported in years.
There are two forces driving the crisis recovery pattern in Table 1. First, in the midst of the crisis, when
the constraints are the tightest, the asset values are low. The intermediary sector earns a high risk premium
by holding the distressed assets. This causes wt to on average rise, with the eﬀect obviously stronger when
the risk premium is higher. As a result, the recovery speeds are shorter (third column) when risk premia
are higher. Second, as wt rises, there is reintermediation as households match the rise in wt by contributing
22Table 1: Crisis Recovery
This table presents transition time data from simulating the calibrated model in
He and Krishnamurthy (2008b). Fix a state corresponding to an instantaneous
risk premium of 20% (“Transit from”). Simulating the model from that initial
condition, the table reports the ﬁrst passage time that the state hits the risk
premium corresponding to that in the “Transit to” column. Time is reported
in years. The column “Increment time” reports the time between incremental
“Transit to” rows.
Transit from 20 Increment time
Transit to
15 0.23 0.23
12.5 0.46 0.23
10 1.02 0.56
7.5 2.62 1.6
6 5.91 3.29
5 12.88 7.1
M times the increase in wt. That is, the balance sheet constraints loosen as wt rises, further quickening the
recovery.
The magnitudes and patterns of crisis recovery illustrated in Table 1 are similar to crisis recovery patterns
witnessed in practice, as discussed in He and Krishnamurthy. For example, in the 1998 hedge fund crisis, the
crisis reaches a peak in October of 1998. From this peak, the risk premia in the aﬀected markets take about
9 months to fall halfway back to their pre-crisis levels. This magnitude of half-life is similar to empirical
studies of other crisis episodes.
5 Ampliﬁcation through Uncertainty
In early 2007, banks were well capitalized and ﬂush with cash. Similar statements of health could be made
about most of the key pieces of the ﬁnancial sector. In terms of the model just discussed, L was high and d0
was low. From the vantage of the balance sheet liquidation mechanism, these benign initial conditions make
it hard to understand the extent of the recent crisis.
I argue in this section that an important ampliﬁcation mechanism in the recent crisis has to do with
lack of knowledge and uncertainty. Investors had rapidly adopted a ﬁnancial innovation – the credit market
structures – with which they had a limited history. When AAA subprime tranches suﬀered losses, investors
realized that they had not understood the securitized credit structures they had purchased. Investors were
not surprised that high-risk homeowners defaulted on some loans; rather, they were surprised that such
23defaults had a material eﬀect on the values of the most senior of the tranches backed by pools of subprime
mortgages. Moreover, given that a myriad other credit products - not just mortgage – had been structured
in much the same way as subprime investments, investors’ model-uncertainty was across the entire credit
market.
Thus, the small cash-ﬂow shock of subprime defaults resulted in a large shock to investors’ uncertainty.
Moreover there was contagion across the entire credit market due to investors’ model uncertainty. The
response of investors to their uncertainty was to disengage. Investors went back to the drawing board to
formulate new models. In the meantime, given that they did not have a clear understanding of events, they
took decisions to protect themselves against worst-case scenarios on the risks that they did not understand.
The result of all of this disengagement was a loss of liquidity, with many attendant eﬀects.
Investors’ dramatic disengagement and emphasis on protecting against a worst-case event is hard to
capture within a standard model of decision making. In the standard model, agents consider all possible
models — for example, models in which AAA tranches are not risky and those in which they are risky
— placing probabilities on each of the possible models, and then making decisions that average over the
models in a Bayesian fashion. The shock (i.e. AAA defaults) leads agents to adjust their model-probabilities,
increasing their weight on the model in which AAA tranches are risky. Of course such a reassessment leads
to lower prices on the AAA tranches. But, it does not lead to disengagement nor the worst-case decision
rules that have been witnessed recently.13
The main diﬃcult with the standard model in capturing these events is that under the Savage axioms for
decision-making, model uncertainty and risk regarding cash-ﬂows are treated the same way. Indeed, leaving
aside the subprime example that I have given, there is a long tradition in Economics dating back to Knight
(1921) that recognizes that risk and uncertainty provoke diﬀerent behavioral responses. The point is most
clearly made in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox. Giving people choices between gambles where some gambles
had clearly speciﬁed odds, while others did not, Ellsberg found that people consistently avoided the gambles
with unknown odds. In fact, Ellsberg found that one could combine the known and unknown gambles in
ways that showed that people violated the Savage axioms.
Beginning with Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988), there have been a number of papers aimed at developing
13Routledge and Zin (2005) argue similarly that the trading-halts and disengagement we observe during ﬁnancial crises are
an important reason to think that these events are about Knightian uncertainty. Routledge and Zin develop a model in which
uncertainty leads to a trading hald and widening of bid-ask spreads.
24a theory of decision-making that distinguishes between risk and uncertainty and is consistent with the
behavior noted by Ellsberg. Consider a decision problem where a state ω ∈ Ω will be realized tomorrow.
The probability distribution over the states is denoted by π. An agent makes a decision d ∈ D today that
results in utility u(c(ω,d)) in state ω. The standard Expected Utility representation of this decision problem
is that the agent solves,
max
d∈D
Eπ[u(c(ω,d))].
Suppose however that agents are uncertain over the probability distribution π. In particular, suppose that
this uncertainty is that agents only know that π ∈ Π. Then, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s Maximin Expected
Utility representation of Knightian uncertainty aversion is,
max
d∈D
min
π∈Π
Eπ[u(c(ω,d))].
The “min” operator is the key here: agents use a worst-case for the uncertain probabilities π when making
their decision.
In the subprime example, one may consider that agents had a model π ∈ Π0 in mind at the beginning
of 2007. The default events led them to become uncertain, so that they considered a larger class of models
Π1 (e.g., Π0 ⊂ Π1). Although the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) theory is not dynamic and therefore does
not explain how agents’ priors are updated, there has been subsequent work in the decision theory literature
that does (see Hanany and Klibanoﬀ, 2007, for discussion of this research).
This section presents extensions of the model to incorporate Knightian uncertainty, in ways guided by
the recent credit crisis, and shows that the model can well capture recent events. I then turn to a discussion
of some other historical crises in light of the uncertainty model, arguing that the subprime case illustrates a
more general pattern present in other ﬁnancial crises. Finally, I discuss policy in the uncertainty model and
compare it to policy in the balance sheet liquidation model.
5.1 Counterparty Risk
I return to the benchmark model described in Section 3 where a class of atomistic investors purchase an asset
at date 0, considering that they may receive a liquidity shock at date 1 and that a ﬁnancial intermediary
with balance sheet liquidity of L will be the liquidity provider in such an event.
In the subprime context, we may imagine that the liquidity shock is a loss in the agent’s subprime
investments that necessitates rebalancing the agent’s portfolio. The shock probabilities for each class of
25investors, A and B, is φ. I have thus far treated the shocks as independent, but suppose that the shocks have
correlation of ρ, possibly diﬀerent than zero. Moreover, suppose that agents are uncertain over the value of
ρ, knowing only that ρ ∈ [−1,+1].
The problem of an investor at date 0 is to decide how much to pay for the asset, given the agent’s
probability of liquidation and the price-support provided by the intermediary. Uncertainty enters into this
decision because the agent knows that the intermediary has limited balance sheet liquidity, and if shocks to
both A and B occur at the same time, the intermediary will not be able to provide full price support.
This way of introducing uncertainty captures “counterparty risk.” Will the intermediary be able to deliver
on its liquidity when needed, or will other shocks deplete the intermediary’s liquidity so that it (partially)
defaults? In the current context, the concern may be, how widespread are the subprime losses and where
are these losses buried? Note also that even if A can accurately assess his own shock probability to be φ, the
modeling is that he may be uncertain about the shock distribution for B. This is another way of thinking
about counterparty risk – i.e., A’s concern is will risks to other agents end up aﬀecting him?
It is obvious that in the simple setup the “worst-case” for the agents is if ρ = +1. The maximin decision
rule is to purchase the asset assuming that the counterparty risk is the highest. The date 0 price is then
P0 = 1 − (1 − L/2)φ. (10)
Comparing this expression to that in equation (2) where P0 = 1 − (1 − L/2)φ2, we see that uncertainty
magniﬁes the importance of the liquidation event from order φ2 to order φ.
5.2 Wasted Balance Sheet Liquidity
Consider the following implementation of the price support equilibrium. Suppose that in purchasing the
asset at date 0, the investors require that the intermediary set up two divisions, each with L/2 units of
liquidity. Division A promises liquidity to investor-class A, and likewise for division B. This implementation
disentangles the A shock from the B shock, removing counterparty risk. Eﬀectively each agent disengages
from the risks that he does not understand and guarantees a known amount of liquidity for himself. Each
investor then prices the asset at date 0 requiring only the knowledge of their own shock-probability. Hence,
P0 = 1 − (1 − L/2)φ.
However the over-collateralization comes at a cost. Part of the intermediary’s balance sheet liquidity of L
is wasted in the equilibrium because there are states at date 1, the ones in which only one of A or B receive
26the liquidation shock, in which the liquidity of the non-shock division goes unused. Investor’s uncertainty
causes the eﬀective balance sheet liquidity of the intermediary to fall.
Financial crises are not typically about an aggregate shortage of resources, but rather about the distri-
bution of these resources. Resources that could be valuably deployed stay on the sidelines. For instance, in
the recent credit market events, regulators have been concerned that many banks have been hoarding their
liquidity, causing the money market to be illiquid. Uncertainty-induced liquidity waste is one way to model
these outcomes.
5.3 Individual Exposure to Aggregate Risk
In the recent crisis, banks have been unsure of the extent of their own exposure to subprime and related
credit risks. The problem stems from the complexity of these instruments. Diﬀerent parts of banks have
diﬀerent risk exposures. Taking stock of all of this to provide an overall risk picture for a bank has taken
time and proven diﬃcult. The problem has been compounded because in many cases the markets for the
relevant assets have become illiquid, making it diﬃcult to measure market values.
On the other hand, it has been easier to estimate the aggregate losses stemming from subprime defaults.
That is, beginning with the subprime borrowers, one can estimate default probabilities and recovery rates on
default, and provide an upper bound on the subprime losses. Brunnermeier (2008) reports an over-estimate
here of $500 bn. The uncertainty over the credit market structures is what has made it diﬃcult to measure
individual exposures to the aggregate risk.
Consider the following variation of the model. Suppose that at date 1 there are only two states, shock
or no-shock (with probabilities φ and 1 − φ). In the shock state, only one of either agents A or B receive
a liquidity shock. Agents are uncertain over which agent will receive the shock. Denote φA and φB as the
shock probabilities for A and B. Since only one of A or B will receive the shock,
φA + φB = φ
However, suppose that A is uncertain over the value of φA. A only knows that φA ∈ [φ/2 − K,φ/2 + K]
(K ≤ φ/2). The treatment of B is symmetric.14
14In this model, one solution to the uncertaintyproblem is for A and B to cross-insure each other. Both buy insurance against
their own shock state and sell insurance against the others’ shock state. I am assuming that markets are incomplete so that
this trade is not possible. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) develop a related model based on uncertainty over idiosyncratic
27It is easy to see how the uncertainty aﬀects the date 0 decision. The worst-case for the agent is if their
shock probability is φ/2 + K. Then the agents price the asset so that,
P0 = 1 − (1 − L/2)(φ/2 + K).
Uncertainty reduces the asset price, increasing the importance of the liquidation state. (I have normalized
things by assuming that the intermediary has L/2 units of liquidity, since liquidity needs have been halved
relative to the previous extension.)
5.4 History and Financial Innovation
The preceding extensions illustrate how a rise in Knightian uncertainty can lead to a lack of liquidity. My
modeling choices in the extensions are guided by the subprime crisis. In this section, I turn to other historical
crisis episodes, interpreting these events in light of the uncertainty model.
The uncertainty model is most suited to environments where market participants have had a limited
experience in dealing with a particular asset. These circumstances provide fertile ground for “unusual”
events – such as the losses on AAA rated subprime tranches. That is, it is likely that something occurs
that is at odds with market participants’ models of the world. Knightian uncertainty and market illiquidity
follow naturally.
Consider in particular the following narrative of a ﬁnancial innovation. A successful ﬁnancial innovation
is a product that meets a market demand and is therefore taken up widely. In the subprime case, securitized
credit products have come to proliferate the market in the short space of ﬁve years. Thus, by its very nature,
a successful ﬁnancial innovation provides market participants with only a short history and there will be
outcomes that people do not expect. The subprime case clearly ﬁts this narrative, but consider some other
historical episodes.
In 1970, the Penn Central Railroad defaulted on $82m of prime-rated commercial paper. The commercial
paper market at the time was not as mature as it is today. It had developed rapidly through the 1960s to meet
growing corporate borrowing needs. However, ratings were not ﬁne tuned and back-up liquidity facilities,
which are standard practice today, did not exist. When the default occurred, it spooked money-market
exposures to aggregate shocks where markets are complete, yet the equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the one described
here. The main modeling diﬀerence is that in Caballero and Krishnamurthy, the model is completely symmetric – there is no
distinction between “A” and “B” types.
28investors. These investors went back to the drawing board to re-evaluate their credit models and ratings
guidelines. The result was disengagement. Investors stopped buying commercial paper completely. Over
time, and with the Fed intervening by encouraging banks to buy commercial paper, the market normalized.
Contrast this event with the 1997 Mercury Finance - another commercial paper borrower – default on
$500m of paper. The default was much larger in real terms than Penn Central and was similarly a surprise
to the market. In contrast to the Penn Central case, there were no eﬀects on the commercial paper market.
The reason is that it quickly became clear that the default was a case of fraudulent accounting in Mercury
Finance. The uncertainty element that had been important in 1970 was not present.
Another example to illustrate these points is the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. The new
innovation in this episode was portfolio insurance strategies – that is, the synthetic replication of put options.
This was a strategy that had become increasingly common among investors in this period. However, in 1987
it was unclear how widespread these strategies were and how ﬁnancial markets would equilibrate in the
presence of portfolio insurance strategies. The speed of the market decline on October 19 took everyone by
surprise. Market makers widened their bid-ask spreads and other key market players pulled out of the market
completely. The result was a lack of liquidity. Many observers point to the option-replication drive sales
into an illiquid market as being an important factor in the market crash. Today, these types of replications
strategies are common and well understood by all market participants.
My last example is the hedge fund crisis of the fall of 1998. In this scenario, hedge funds were still a
relatively new and opaque ﬁnancial vehicle. Assets under hedge fund management had grown from around
$10 bn in 1991 to $80 bn in 1997 (still far less than the trillions under management today). In the fall
of 1998, even sophisticated market participants such as Long Term Capital Management were taken by
surprise by the unprecedented comovement of Russian government bond spreads, Brazilian spreads, and
U.S. Treasury bond spreads. The standard risk management models that hedge funds used were no longer
applicable (Scholes, 2000). The result was that ﬁnancial market participants searched for new models and
made decisions based on worst-case scenarios. We now know that hedge funds had similar strategies and
had ﬁlled up a similar asset space, and that this was the source of the correlations. Indeed risk management
strategies post-1998 explicitly account for high-correlation illiquidity events. But at the time neither hedge
funds nor their creditor banks understood this point. The result of this uncertainty was illiquidity and
crisis.15
15While in 1998 hedge funds were still a novel ﬁnancial vehicle, the large reported losses of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006
29The preceding discussion covers three of the major ﬁnancial crises experienced in the U.S. over the last 50
years.16 Each of these episodes is associated with a ﬁnancial innovation, and occurred at a time when market
participants had only a limited history within which to understand ﬁnancial developments, suggesting that
Knightian uncertainty is an important factor in many ﬁnancial crises.
5.5 Policy
As in the liquidation model, the lender of last resort policy is valuable in the uncertainty model. Consider
that if the central bank commits to inject one unit of resources into the intermediary (increasing L) in
the two-shock state, this commitment can have a large ex-ante eﬀect. In the counterparty risk example I
have developed, the increase in P0 due to this commitment is of order φ, while in the baseline model the
commitment increases P0 with order φ2. In the correlation risk example, the increase in P0 is proportional
to φ/2+K, while in the baseline case, the increase is proportional to φ/2. In eﬀect, the central bank delivers
resources to the market in the states that agents are most anxious about. Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2008) develop this point more fully, discussing some of the welfare issues that arise when agents’ preference
do not satisfy the Savage axioms.
While crisis policy is similar across the uncertainty and liquidation model, my conjecture is that there is
less scope for ex-ante policy in the model. In the liquidation model, the date 0 policy is to reduce leverage.
As I have noted, in a more sophisticated model this policy will be about incentivizing agents to improve
risk management. Agents must increase the liquidity of their balance sheets only in the states of the world
where a liquidity event will occur. This leads to the following question. Does the central bank know which
states are the uncertainty-crisis states? Consider that the central bank is in the same (or worse) position as
the private sector in forecasting how a crisis on a new ﬁnancial innovation will unfold. Of course the central
bank can require a blunt policy such as carry more liquidity/reduce leverage/reduce asset positions into all
states of the world. But such a policy may be prohibitively costly since it distorts private sector actions in
non-crisis states, and these states may be the more likely ones. The conjecture needs to be investigated more
fully.
barely caused a ripple in ﬁnancial markets.
16See Calomiris (1994) on the Penn Central default, Melamed (1998) on the 1987 market crash, Scholes (2000) on the events
of 1998, and Stewart (2002) or McAndrews and Potter (2002) on 9/11.
305.6 Interactions and Crisis Recovery
I have discussed the two ampliﬁcation mechanisms – through prices and through uncertainty – separately
for pedagogical purposes. But there may be interesting ways in which they interact. What follows are my
observations on interactions that may have played a role in recent events. I am investigating these issues
more formally in current research.
In the recent subprime crisis, I have argued that the initial market dynamic was driven by uncertainty. As
investors grappled with the complexities of credit market instruments, their behavioral response caused asset
prices to fall. With banks marking their assets to market, two competing forces emerged. On the one hand,
the realization of losses reduced the extent of uncertainty in the marketplace. On the other hand, with banks
writing down losses, their balance sheets suﬀered and the eﬀects highlighted by the balance-sheet/asset-price
feedback began to dominate the markets.17
Routledge and Zin (2005) develop a micro-structure model of asset trade in which Knightian uncertainty
leads to a trading halt and widening of bid-ask spreads. Their model suggests that uncertainty inhibits the
process of price discovery, rendering market prices uninformative about fundamental value. This too may be
interestingly related to balance sheet eﬀects. Accounting rules require that banks mark their books to market
prices. However in an environment of uncertainty, where market prices are suspect, such mark-to-market
accounting becomes diﬃcult. This eﬀect has also been apparent in recent events.
These observations can shed light on how a market recovers from an uncertainty-driven crisis. It is clear
from the model I have outlined as well as the historical examples I have given that the uncertainty crisis is
only resolved over time as investors understand where they went wrong and formulate new models of the
world; in short, as the uncertainty is resolved. Part of this process involves information revelation. What
mistakes have investors made? Which investors have large exposures to the relevant assets, and how big are
their losses? In an environment where the price discovery mechanism is impaired, information revealed from
mark-to-market accounting becomes hard to interpret. Further, in an environment where balance sheets are
weak, a ﬁnancial institution will be reluctant to realize losses. These forces tend to perpetuate an uncertain
environment, and may reduce recovery times relative to those suggested in Section 4.4.
17We can also imagine the interaction going in the other direction. Consider that in 1998, the Russian default triggered a
liquidation event in hedge-fund dominated markets. The resulting unexpected correlation among market prices was a surprise
to most market participants and triggered an uncertainty dynamic.
316 Conclusion
This paper has described two ampliﬁcations mechanisms that operate during liquidity crises and studied the
scope for ex-ante and ex-post central bank policies under each mechanism. There are many aspects of the
mechanisms I have discussed that require further research. Let me conclude by mentioning two particularly
fruitful avenues of research.
First, given the primacy of intermediaries’ balance sheet liquidity in crisis dynamics, it is important to
understand the microeconomic foundations of balance sheet liquidity. This is a question for corporate ﬁnance.
The liability side of a ﬁnancial institution plays an important part in balance sheet liquidity. Short-term
debt creates less liquidity, while equity creates more liquidity. How can we explain the ﬁnancing patterns we
observe in practice? Why have some institutions chosen to ﬁnance mortgage loans by borrowing in short-
term debt market, creating low balance sheet liquidity and increasing the likelihood of a liquidity crisis?
Why, as a crisis unfolds, are institutions forced to rely more on short-term debt than equity as a funding
source? Moreover, traditional banking oversight concerns the regulation of balance sheet liquidity. As these
regulations are extended to the non-bank ﬁnancial sector, it is important to understand in what dimensions
such regulations may be appropriately extended. Without a ﬁrm understanding of the corporate ﬁnancing
foundations of balance sheet liquidity, these issues cannot be satisfactorily addressed.
Second, taking a reduced form approach to corporate ﬁnance, as I have done in this paper, it is still
interesting to explore the quantitative dimensions of these ampliﬁcation mechanisms. That is, it is important
to build calibrated models of these ampliﬁcation mechanisms in which to explore the quantitative impact of
policy. While I have noted some work on this topic in this paper, more still remains to be done.
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